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NOTES
THE NEW MEXICO MEDICO-LEGAL
MALPRACTICE PANEL-AN ANALYSIS
This paper is a study and evaluation of the New Mexico Medico-Legal Malpractice Panel. A number of such instrumentalities are
described in medical and legal literature. Despite the volume of
writing on the subject, however, the literature is confined to
operational descriptions.
This paper attempts to do more. It first generally describes the key
problem in litigation under the law of medical malpractice-the
conspiracy of silence. It goes on to deal with some of the societal
factors that seem to bear on malpractice controversies. It then
describes a number of attempts to overcome the problems of
malpractice and the conspiracy of silence. Some of these are legal
developments. Others are extra-judicial. In dealing with the problems
and with attempts to meet them, we identify some characteristics of
desirable solutions to the malpractice problem.
The New Mexico panel is discussed from an operational standpoint.
In a series of interviews, we attempted to discover personal and
professional reactions to the panel, its method of operations, and its
effect on those who utilize it. From this we attempt to evaluate the
panel in terms of the needs of parties to controversies, the needs of
their counsel, and the need of society to fairly resolve disputes.
Finally, we suggest changes that might be considered in panel
operations, and a few ideas about further research.
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE CONSPIRACY
OF SILENCE
A. The MalpracticeConcept
Malpractice is usually defined quite broadly. The term refers to any
professional misconduct; it may relate to bad, wrong or injudicious
treatment of a disease or injury. It is often said to proceed from
ignorance, carelessness, want of professional skill, or disregard of
established medical rules or principles. Sometimes it arises from
malice or criminal intent.' Almost any wrongful act that a doctor may
commit on a patient can be characterized as an act of malpractice.
The usual case arises in negligence, and deals with the alleged failure
of a physician to care for his patient with the required skill and care.
But a significant minority of cases arises on different grounds,
including breach of express agreement, assault and abandonment. 2
1. Black's Law Dictionary 1110 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
2. D. Louisell and H. Williams, Trial of Medical Malpractice Cases 187-188 (1960)
(hereinafter cited as Louisell & Williams).
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is
In New Mexico, as in most jurisdictions, the law of malpractice
3 The New Mexico statutes are silent on the matter.4 New
judge-made.
Mexico appellate cases on malpractice have been few-perhaps 11
have gone up on appeal in the past 20 years. The reported cases are
sufficient to show quite clearly, however, that the state is in accord
with most American jurisdictions on the requirement of expert
of care, departures from those stantestimony to prove standards
5 and causation. 6
dards,
The state's Uniform Jury Instructions-Civil permit an expert to
state an opinion,7 which in malpractice is binding on the jury unless
expertly controverted. 8 The instructions require the physician "to
possess and apply the knowledge and to use the skill and care that was
ordinarily used by reasonably well qualified doctors of the same field
circumstances, giving due
of medicine . . . practicing under similar
9 Where the physician is a
consideration to the locality involved."
specialist, he is to be judged by standards of his specialty, again giving
10 On these questions the
"due consideration" to the locality.
is relevant. 1 Where
testimony
instructions provide that only expert
the question is one of the patient's consent, the instructions permit
on the standards concerned, but their testimony is
experts to testify
12
not conclusive.
- As a practical matter, a malpractice plaintiff in New Mexico, as
elsewhere, cannot go far without expert testimony. Often, however,
plaintiffs have found expertise difficult if not impossible to obtain.
B. The Conspiracyof Silence
"Clearly," says one authority, "there is a general reluctance of
physicians to testify to facts or to give opinions which likely will
involve their brethren in legal liability or professional embarrassment
13
Moreover, courts and lawyers
growing out of alleged malpractice.'
have seen this reluctance result in miscarriages of justice; they have
3. Id. at 188.
under
4. New Mexico has a Good Samaritan Law which exculpates persons from liability
statute
a
has
also
state
The
1968).
(Repl.
12-12-3
Ann.
Stat.
N.M.
conditions.
certain emergency
N.M. Stat.
exempting blood and its products from warranty provisions and from strict liability.
Ann. 12-12-5 (Supp. 1971).
5. Cervantes v. Forbis, 73 N.M. 445, 389 P.2d 210 (1964); Los Alamos Medical Center v. Coe,
58 N.M. 686, 275 P.2d 175 (1959).
6. Schn v. Seidenberg, 80 N.M. 573, 458 P.2d 825 (1969).
).
7. N.M. Uniform Jury Instructions No. 15.1 (1966). (hereinafter cited as UJI No. _
8. UJI No. 8.0 (1966).
9. UJI No. 8.1 (1966).
10. UJI No. 8.2 (1966).
11. UJI No. 8.1 and 8.2(1966).
12. UJI No. 8.4 (1966).
13. louisell & Williams, supra note 2,at 419.
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seen defense experts who "have blinded themselves to the realities,
even to the point of willful misrepresentation or perjury."' 14
There are four reasons for the conspiracy. First, there is the
fundamental difference between medicine's objective pursuit of truth,
and the legal system's pursuit of justice through the adversary system.
Second, many physicians think that if they enter a suit as a witness,
they remain in it, somehow, as a party; their professional views and
opinions are laid on the line and are subject to energetic impeachment. Third, many doctors simply do not understand the
adversary method. And fourth, many medical people resent the
demands that trials make on their time.' 5
In addition, many doctors feel highly defensive about the subject of
malpractice. There but for the Grace of God, they think, go I. There
is a very human unwillingness to injure others with whom one is in
frequent contact. Testimony on local practice may threaten a
colleague. Other doctors and insurance carriers may bring pressure to
prevent a physician from providing expert testimony. 16
Worse still, some doctors seem to believe that most malpractice
claims are wholly without merit, brought by disgruntled patients
seeking to enrich themselves at the doctor's expense. These physicians
blame lawyers' contingent fees,' 7 and want legislation barring them in
malpractice cases, if not barring the cause of action entirely. 18 Others
favor abolition of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 19

C. Magnitude of the Problem
Physicians' attitudes towards lawyers, courts and claimants have
done nothing to reduce complaints. More and more patients arrive in
lawyers' offices. The American Medical Association reports that
malpractice claims rose tenfold from 1930 to 1940, tenfold again from
1940 to 1950, and that they continue to rise at a very rapid rate.2 0 In
14. Id. at 420.
15. Id. at 422 et seq.; G. Hau, Let's UnderstandEach Other, 42 111.
B.J. 690 (1954).
16. Louisell & Williams, supra note 2,at 423.
17. Id.; See also, Kelner, The Conspiracy of Silence, Trial, Feb./Mar. 1970, at 18; Pattison,
The Malpractice Dilemma, 100 Archives of Surgery 325 (1970), in which the author asserts that
80 percent of malpractice claims are unjustified; Interview with Ralph Marshall, Executive
Secretary, New Mexico Medical Society, in Albuquerque, April 18, 1972.
18. See, note 17, supra. See also Durant, A Four Step Program, Trial, Feb./Mar. 1970, at 26.
19. See, notes 17 and 18, supra. See also, Note, Medical Malpractice Litigation: Some
Suggested Improvements and a Possible Alternative, 18 U. Fla. L. Rev. 623 (1966); Letourneau,
Medical MalpracticePatient Versus Physician: The Ribicoff Report, Hospital Management, April
1970, at 18. See generally, A. Ribicoff, Senate Subcomm. on Executive Reorganization 91st
Cong., Sess., Report on Medical Malpractice: The Patient Versus the Physician (Comm.
Print 1969) (hereinafter cited as Ribicoff Report).
20. Committee Report, ProfessionalLiability of the Physician, 183 J.A.M.A. 695 (1963).
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southern California, 350 physicians are said21 to have left practice
because of rising malpractice insurance rates.
A recent Congressional investigation concluded that more Americans are receiving more medical care now than ever before. The
number of physicians in practice, however, has not increased in
proportion to the demand.2 2 Two reasons are given for increased
demand for medical services. First, there are Medicaid and Medicare,
which between them have brought millions of Americans into the
market for health-care services of all kinds.2 3 Many medical writers
report great increases in demand in the last five or six years. 24 Second,
today's physician commands an imposing array of machinery, manpower, drugs and techniques with which to bring about a cure. But
operation of the entire array calls for great precision and complex
coordination. The more complex the operation, the greater the
number of patients and the greater the pressure of time on physicians,
the more opportunities there are for something to go wrong. 25
One recent study concluded that malpractice suits are rising
sharply, especially in metropolitan areas where quality of care is said
to be best, and most notable in California, New York, and Washington, D.C. The study found awards and settlements increasing in
amount. Insurance premiums were said to be rising "geometrically,"
with many insurers unwilling to accept the risks at 26any price.
Insurance costs are necessarily passed on to the consumer.
The study agreed that the situation may be forcing some physicians
out of practice. It found that problems of obtaining insurance may
discourage some young doctors from entering higher risk fields of
medicine or practicing in higher risk parts of the country. "The
situation," concluded the study, "threatens to become a national
crisis."27

ATTEMPTS TO IMPROVE MALPRACTICE
LITIGATION
A.

General
A fundamental problem in malpractice cases arises because one
side sustains the injury, and the other controls the evidence. Two
types of approaches have been taken to ease the problem.
First, the developing common law in some jurisdictions has adopted
any one of several tools that, in effect, permit the plaintiff to get to
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Letourneau, supra note 19 at 18.
Ribicoff Report, supra note 19.
Id.
Pattison, supra note 17.
Ribicoff Report, supro note 19.
Id.
Id.

May 19731

NEW MEXICO MEDICO-LEGAL PANEL

the jury without local expert testimony on standards of care, breach of
those standards, or causation. The most commonly used is probably
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Other such tools include the use of
medical books or brochures by the plaintiff and admission of
testimony of experts from outside the jurisdiction. Because these
concepts are discussed elsewhere in this issue, we will omit discussion
of them except to say that, by themselves, they have been inadequate
to solve the inherent problems in medical malpractice litigation.2 8
Second, many extrajudicial plans have been devised to act on
malpractice cases before they get to court. Some plans are in effect
mutual protective associations-they protect physicians against
claims. Others, in almost every state, respond to patients complaints
by controlling a physician's license to practice, or by attempting to
adjust disputes over fees. Some plans involve arbitration. Others are at
the disposal of the courts, rather than of the parties. Some, like New
Mexico's, are screening panels intended to eliminate cases without
merit, and to support meritorious claims. Still others amount to little
more than lists of physicians willing to examine persons complaining
of malpractice, and to give testimony if in their judgment the claim is
well founded.
B. ExtrajudicialPlans
1. Medical ProfessionalActivities.
Several state medical societies operate panels composed wholly of
physicians whose purpose is to advise a doctor charged with
malpractice whether to defend.2 9 Normally, only the defendant and
his attorney appear before these panels. Their usefulness to plaintiffs
is limited to those occasions in which they advise the doctor to settle.
New Mexico's medical society, like most, maintains a grievance
committee to adjudicate, on a voluntary basis, patient complaints of
overcharges. The committee also adjusts disputes between doctors.
These committees exist primarily to enforce professional discipline.
Insofar, however, as they may mitigate patient ill-will arising from
fees or collection practices, they may forestall malpractice complaints. 30
2. InterprofessionalCodes and Panels.
A few states have promulgated codes to govern relations between
lawyers and doctors. Because they tend to facilitate communications
28. Roehl, The Law of Medical Malpracticein New Mexico, 3 N.M.L. Rev. 294 (1973).
29. Holder, Joint Screening Panels, 215 J.A.M.A. 10, 1715 (1971).
30. Interview with Ralph Marshall, Executive Secretary New Mexico Medical Society, in
Albuquerque, April 18, 1972 (hereinafter cited as Marshall interview).
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between the two professions, they probably also aid the lawyer's
evaluation of a malpractice claim as well as his negotiations in and
trial of the case.
The Vermont Interprofessional Code, 3 ' declares that the physician
is to provide the attorney with requested information in a reasonable
time, and to report changes in patient status. The lawyer has the duty
to pay the doctor promptly, and to provide him with appropriate
releases. The code authorizes conferences and places on the lawyer
the duty of scheduling medical testimony as conveniently as possible
for the physician. It bars use of subpoenas unless the doctor refuses to
attend court. It emphasizes the obligations of the physician to testify,
and to give depositions when requested to do so. The code is enforced
by a joint committee empowered to recommend disciplinary action to
either professional society.
32
Oregon bar and medical societies have a similar code. It is
concerned with resolving interprofessional disputes on expert testimony, examinations, compensation and the like. Though there has
been some interest in establishing a screening panel, the Oregon State'
Bar has not done so. 3 3 Where the Vermont Code encourages informal
consultation between attorneys and physicians, the Oregon Code
requires a high degree of formality, especially in releases.
By delineating ground rules for contact between the two professions, the interprofessional codes probably benefit the plaintiff by
making it more difficult for physicians to refuse cooperation. The
codes, however, seem to do little if anything more than most doctors
and lawyers are capable of doing for themselves.
3. Medical Screening-the Los Angeles Plan.
The Los Angeles County Bar Association and the community's
medical society maintain a roster of local physicians willing to serve
as plaintiff's experts in malpractice cases. Counsel for the plaintiff
contacts the bar association's office. The request for referral is sent to
a participating physician who may refuse the assignment. A subsequent referral will be made. If, however, the plaintiff's attorney is
dissatisfied with the physician's conclusions and the testimony he is
willing to offer, the attorney has no right to ask a second referral.
Though the plan has encountered problems over physicians' fees, the
31. Committee Report, InterprofessionalCodes, 1971 Vt. Bar J. 131.
32. Oregon State Bar and Oregon State Medical Society, Statement of Principles Governing
Certain Lawyer-Physician Relationships, approved and adopted in 1954 with amendments
through 1961 (1962).
33. Letter from John H. Holloway, Secretary of the Oregon State Bar, to Earl R. Cooper,4
Executive Director, State Bar of NewMexico, February 22, 1971.
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bar association apparently believes the plan is working well. 34 In
1970, a total of 64 referrals were made on 43 requests, including five
second referrals where
for additional information and, evidently, 16
35
the first referred physician declined the case.
The Los Angeles County Bar has found that the County Medical
Association has not kept the panel up to date; there has been difficulty
in finding doctors willing to accept referrals in some specialties. The
bar association has found that its referral service is used most often by
attorneys handling occasional malpractice claims.36Those who handle
such claims frequently maintain their own panels.
4. ArbitrationPlans.
The Southern California Joint Demonstration Project united the
American Arbitration Association, the California Hospital Association
and the State Medical Association in a two-year venture in which
patients were asked to sign a consent to arbitration when entering a
hospital. 3 7 Claims totaling less than $20,000 were heard by one
lawyer arbitrator. Those of $20,000 or more were arbitrated by a
panel consisting of an attorney, a doctor and a businessman.
At about the same time, a Los Angeles group of about 150
physicians, serving about 90,000 patients, set up an arbitration plan-of
its own. It is reported to have achieved "surprisingly low" malpractice insurance rates. 3 8 In both the demonstration project and the
private plan, participants believed they had achieved important
benefits of speed, privacy, informality and elimination of any need to
39
apply res ipsa loquitur.
One commentator writes that the Demonstration Project was
"basically sound" but "never got off the ground." 40 Certainly,
however, arbitration is capable of producing important benefits. It is
quick, saves the time of all the professionals involved, and tends to
reduce costs on both sides of the case. If it is true that malpractice is
very expensive to defend, then this savings alone should be substantial
for insured physicians and their patients. It is important that the
southern California experience with arbitration has apparently won
34. Los Angeles County Bar Association, Professional Liability Medical Panel-procedure,
and accompanying letter (undated, files of Irwin Moise, Albuquerque, New Mexico).
35. Letter from Donald 0. Hagler, Assistant to the Executive Director, Los Angeles County
Bar Association, to Earl R. Cooper, Executive Director, State Bar of New Mexico, February 23,
1971.
36. Id.
37. Pattison, The Malpractice Dilemma, 100 Archives of Surgery 325 (1970).
38. Id. at 328.
39. Id.
40. Letoureau, supra note 19, at 20.
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favorable response from insurance carriers who direct the defense of
malpractice suits. Without their cooperation, no plan can succeed for
long.
5. Independent Expert Testimony-The New York Plan.
By special rule of the State Supreme Court, 4 1 a trial judge is
authorized to obtain impartial expert testimony Wherever the court
believes it will aid materially in determination of the case. Such.
testimony is obtained without cost to the parties. Physicians are
appointed in accordance with an agreement between medical and
legal societies. 4 2 Evaluating the plan's early experience, one commentator said it discourages exaggerated claims, promotes honesty in
medical testimony, encourages quicker and more frequent
settlements, and improves the competence and impartiality of
43
medical evidence.
In personal injury trials where expert testimony varies widely,
44
impartial testimony may do much to clarify facts for the jury. But in
malpractice cases, where the conspiracy of silence arises from
considerations of professional reputation not present in other personal
injury actions, such testimony may not be readily available or fully
objective.
6. Malpractice Screening Panels.
Screening panels composed of physicians alone or combined with
lawyers have been established in a number of areas. A recent article
in the Journal of the American Medical Association refers to those in
Phoenix (Pima County), Arizona; Denver, Colorado; Reno, Nevada;
New Mexico; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; New Jersey; and Nassau County, New York. 45 A survey conducted in early 1971 by the State Bar of
New Mexico indicated that screening panels are also operative in
Davenport (Scott County), Iowa; 46 Reading (Berks County),
Pennsylvania; 47 the state of Virginia; 48 Seattle (King County),
41. Actually the state's court of original and general jurisdiction.
42. G. Winters, Independent Medical Experts to Testify in New York Injury Cases Under
New Plan, in Selected Writings on Evidence and Trial 605 (1957).
43. New York Medical Expert Testimony Project, in Selected Writings on Evidence and Trial
607 (ed. note) (1957).
44. id.
45. Holder, Joint Screening Panels,215 J.A.M.A. 3 at 1715 (1971).
46. Letter from John E. Nagle, Chairman, Legal Subcommittee, Scott County Bar
Association, to Earl R. Cooper, Executive Director, State Bar of New Mexico, March .16, 1971.
(hereinafter Earl R. Cooper, Executive Director, State Bar of New Mexico, cited as Mr. Cooper).
47. Letter from LeRoy Hyman of Liever, Hyman and Potter, attorneys at law, Reading,
Penn. to Mr. Cooper, February 26, 1971.
48. Letter from N. Samuel Clifton, Executive Director Virginia State Bar, to Mr. Cooper,
February 26, 1971.
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Washington; 4 9 Columbus (Franklin County), Ohio; 50 and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 5 1 All told, at least 13 malpractice screening
panels are functioning in the United States. All are voluntary; only
52
one, the New Jersey plan, offers the option of binding arbitration.
All these plans have three common objectives. First they attempt to
discourage claimants whose cases lack merit from proceeding in
court. Second, they attempt to encourage settlement of meritorious
claims. And third, where settlement is not possible, all make some
provision for expert testimony for the plaintiff.
All panels address themselves to two preliminary questions: Whether there is a "reasonable inference" or "substantial evidence" that the
acts complained of constitute professional negligence; and whether
there is a medical probability that the claimant was injured by those
acts. Beyond this point the plans show considerable variety.53
For example, where the New Jersey plan finds for the claimant, it
will go no further than to recommend settlement unless the claimant,
prior to panel proceedings and prior to filing suit, has agreed to
binding arbitration. 54 The New Jersey plan is the only screening panel
embodied in the rules of court or statute. But while the plan provides
for oral or written evidence, sworn or unsworn, and for cross
examination of the defendant, procedure seems quite informal.5 5 In
the opinion of one attorney, "the plan has had very limited usefulness,
as the extremely informal nature of the same and the composition of
the panels does not, in my opinion, provide for a satisfactory
forum." 56 The state's courts have upheld the binding nature of the
agreement, 57 except in one case where the plaintiff changed counsel
58
prior to hearing.
The Columbus, Ohio plan is only slightly more formal than New
Jersey's-its panel operates informally but in accordance with the
rules of commercial arbitration of the American Arbitration
49. Letters from Helen M. Geisness, Executive Director, Seattle-King County Bar Association, to Mr. Cooper, February 23, 1971: letter from Harry Margolis, bar association
representative to the panel, to Mr. Cooper, February 25, 1971.
50. Letter from Bill Webb, Executive Secretary, Academy of Medicine of Columbus and
Franklin County, to Mr. Cooper, February 22, 1971.
51. Letter from Joseph Neff Ewing, Jr., Chairman, Medico-Legal Committee, Philadelphia
Bar Association, to Mr. Cooper, March 5, 1971.
52. Holder, supra note 29.
53. Berks County Bar Association, Medico-Legal Plan for Screening Malpractice Cases (rev.
June, 1964).
54. N.J. Civ. Prac. R.4:21-7.
55. Id., Rule 4:21-5.
56. Letter from Myron J. Bromberg, attorney and chairman, Joint Conference Committee on
Relations with the Medical Profession, New Jersey State Bar Association, to Mr. Cooper, March
1, 1971.
57. Grove v. Seltzer, 56 N.J. 577, 266 A.2d 301 (1970).
58. Marssello v. Barnett, 50 N.J. 321, 236 A.2d 869 (1967).
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Association. 59 In its first year, the Columbus plan heard three cases, of
which one was decided for the claimaint. Though a medical society
the
spokesman considered it too early to draw conclusions, he said
60
first three cases were "handled in a highly satisfactory manner."
Other panels appear to provide for a much higher degree of
formality, including notice and proof thereof, and submission to the
panel of nearly all the plantiff's case. 61 In the Denver plan, for
example, the formal rules of evidence do not apply but the panel's
62
legal chairman may rule on motions to exclude evidence.
All screening panels appear to provide, at a minimum, that both
parties to a case will be notified of the decision on the two central
questions of negligence and causation. A minority also provide for
subsequent consultation between the parties and panel members or
between the parties and a designated physician on the reasons
supporting the decision. 63 Where this consultation involves a physician, the doctor is authorized to make a charge for his time.
7. Screening Panels and Insurance Carriers.
Any extrajudicial mechanism to deal with problems of malpractice
must have at least the tacit acceptance of insurance carriers if it is to
function. In at least one instance, in Nassau County, New York, plans
to reorganize a screening panel ran afoul of a major malpractice
carrier, that threatened to cancel the insurance policies of physicians
who engaged in arbitration under the plan. 64 Evidently, at least in
65
Nassau County, the insurance carrier wanted binding arbitration.
The role of malpractice insurers will be discussed in more detail in
the next chapter of this paper. At this point, however, it should be
made clear that any solution to problems of malpractice litigation
must have the acquiescence of the insurance industry.
THE MEDICO-LEGAL MALPRACTICE PANEL
OF NEW MEXICO:
OPERATIONS AND PROCEDURES
A., General
The Medico-Legal Malpractice Panel of New Mexico was ap59. Franklin County Medical Arbitration Plan and Accompanying letter from Bill Webb,
note 50 supra.
60. Letter from Bill Webb, supra note 50.
61. See, e.g., Colorado Bar Association and Colorado Medical Society: Interprofessional Code
(1970).
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., the Berks County plan, cited note 53, supra.
64. Letter from Mark Kenyon, Executive Director, Nassau County Medical Society Inc., to
Mr. Cooper, January 22, 1971.
65. Id.
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proved by the State Medical Society's House of Delegates on
November 16, 1961.66 After approval by the State Bar, the plan was
sanctioned by the State Board of Bar Commissioners and became
effective November 23, 1963.67 The panel has operated continuously
since 1963. It has heard (to April, 1972) approximately 100 claims
68
against physicians.
The stated purposes of the panel are to prevent actions in court on
ill-founded malpractice claims, and, where claims are meritorious, to
encourage quick and fair disposition. The plaintiff is encouraged to
come before the panel by a promise of expert testimony if he prevails.
The physician is protected by the confidentiality of the proceedings. 69
The panel consists of 25 lawyer members including a lawyer-chairman, and 15 doctor members, including a medical chairman.7 0 As
amended in 1971, the plan provides for a permanent chairman of the
71
panel who will act as presiding officer at hearings.
B. Procedure
The panel's Rules of Procedure7 2 require that the claimant's
attorney describe in detail the doctor's conduct believed to be
negligent.7 3 The complaint also lists other medical personnel who
have had contact with the claimant. It may be amended at any time
up to 15 days prior to hearing. The panel, is authorized to hear
complaints where the statute of limitations has been waived or where
suit has been filed previously. On filing, the parties agree that no
attempt will be made to use matter presented to the panel as direct or
4
impeachment evidence.7
On receiving a complaint, the executive secretary of the State
Medical Society chooses a date for hearing and notifies all panel
members of the date and the parties involved. He determines the
availability of members for service. He also contacts all physicians
named in the complaint, including the defendant and the hospital if
appropriate, to obtain all medical records. Where economically
feasible, the records are reproduced and sent to panelists selected to
66. 10 State Bar of'N.M. Bull. 205 et seq., (August 19, 1971).

67. Id.
68. Marshall interview, supra note 30.
69. 10 State Bar of N.M. Bull. 205 et seq., (August 19, 1971).

70. Id.
71. Interviews with Irwin Moise, incumbent chairman of the lawyers' panel, in Albuquerque, March 8 and March 22, 1972. Former State Supreme Court Justices Moise and Paul
Tackett are panel members and share duties as presiding officers at hearings.
72. New Mexico Medical Society and State Bar: Rules of Procedure of the Medico-Legal
Malpractice Panel (January 1, 1968) (hereinafter cited as Rules of Procedure).
73. Id., Rule 1.
74. Id.
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serve. Otherwise, -the records are made available to panelists and
counsel at the medical society's office for at least a week prior to the
75
hearing.
The rles give counsel the right to confer with any physician who is
to testify at the hearing or who has had professional contact with the
plaintiff. 76 Counsel may, where they agree, be present during
presentation of the opposing party's case; all other persons are
excluded unless their presence is authorized by the panel.77 Cross-examination is not permitted; only voting panelists may ask questions.
However, counsel for either party may submit questions in writing to
the panel chairman, who has discretion whether to put them to the
witness. 78 Any medical consultants called by the panel may also
submit written questions to the chairman. 7 9 The panel may refuse to
hear the testimony of independent physicians having no connection
with the case.8 0
Where the claimant prevails and wants a medical witness to testify
in subsequent litigation, the medical society takes responsibility for
providing such a witness. 8 ' Where the plaintiff's case fails, there is no
provision for rehearing.8 2 The panel announces its decision on the
issues of negligence and causation in a memorandum to counsel.8 3 No
one, however, has access to the panel's reasoning: not the attorneys,
not the parties, and not the expert who is selected to testify for the
84
plaintiff.
. Panels sit only on call, and always in the offices of the medical
society in Albuquerque. Panelists make it a practice to convene
privately, often with their specialized consultant, prior to the
hearings. At these meetings, they, and especially lawyer members, try
to familiarize themselves with the general nature of the medical
problems in the case.8 5 In the panel's early years, the medical
society's executive secretary routinely attended the pre-hearing
86
meetings and the hearing itself. He no longer does so.
After hearing the case and examining whatever documents are
submitted, the panel deliberates Accounts of these deliberations
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Marshall interview, supra note 30.
Rules of Procedure, supra note 72, Rule
Rules of Procedure, supra note 72, Rule
Rules of Procedure, supra note 72, Rule
Marshall interview, supra note 30.
Rules of Procedure, supra note 72, Rule
Rules of Procedure, supra note 72, Rule
Rules of Procedure, supra note 72, Rule
Marshall interview, supra, note 30.
Id.

Id.
Id.

5.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
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indicate that panelists are quite frank and that no attempts are made
to minimize the character or the consequence of physicians' conduct. 87 The panel then proceeds to vote on the negligence and
causation issues.
C. Panel Operations
From its inception through 1971, the New Mexico Medico-Legal
Panel reviewed 82 cases involving a total of 100 physicians. 88 The
panel found 31 doctors negligent. There was one tie vote, which went
for the defendant. The remaining 68 claims were decided for the
defendant physician. The data are summarized in Table I.
TABLE I
Medico-Legal Panel Reviews8 9
Year
1964

Cases
1

Doctors

For Plntf.

1

-

1

2
7
6
12
17
16
7

1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971

4
10
9
12
16
19
11

4
11
10
15
25
22
12

2
4
4
3
8
5
5

Totals

82

100

31

For Def.

68
(plus 1 tie)

In terms of volume, Table I indicates that the panel's workload
peaked in 1969 and 1970, falling off significantly in 1971. The falloff
has continued: the only two cases scheduled for review in the first
quarter of 1972 were cancelled.9 0
From 1964 through 1970 the screening panel found negligence in
26 cases, and no negligence in 61. But a medical society survey
covering the same years indicates that a total of 52 claims-just twice
the number found by the panel-were closed with awards to the
plaintiff by settlement or judgment. 9 1 Data, as accumulated from 720
of 722 physicians in practice or retiring from practice during the
period shown, are tabulated in Table II.
87. Interview with Marshall, supra note 30; Interview with Moise, supra note 71; Interview
with Chiffelle, infra note 106.
88. New Mexico Medical Society, Report of the Medical-Legal Panel to the House of
Delegates (1972).
89. Id.

90. id.
91. Insurance Committee, New Mexico Medical Society, Report (undated, but presenting
figures from 1964-70) (hereinafter cited as Insurance Report).
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TABLE II
Claims Settled and Paid, 1964-197092
Year

No. of Claims

Amount Paid

1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970

8
1
7
10
12
12
2

$

Totals

52

$1,431,444

19,472
15,000
307,700
195,772
784,000
185,500
14,000

The 1968 figure is skewed. It includes settlement of a judgment of
more than $1 million in favor of a single plaintiff. 9 3 But the figures
show that as cases coming before the panel increased in number, so
generally, did the number of claims paid to plaintiffs. The two reports
summarized in Tables I and II do not, of course, establish a causal
relation by themselves. Since spokesmen indicate that very few cases
bypass the panel completely to go on to court, 94 the data suggest that
a good many claims may be settled before reaching the panel-perhaps almost as many as are settled after a panel hearing.
The data collected in New Mexico confirm that malpractice claims
have been on the rise. From eight claims filed against physicians in
1964, and one filed in 1965, the totals rose to 27 in 1969 and 18 in
1970. 95 The available data do not indicate how many of the 87 claims
filed in the seven years studied were against the same defendant
physicians, but in addition to actual claims reported, 117 physicians
reported that they had been threatened but that no claims were filed
against them. It is clear from these figures that malpractice is not an
abstract threat for the New Mexico medical profession. About
one-eighth of all the state's physicians actually had claims brought
against them between 1964 and 1970, while almost one doctor in four
was either claimed against or threatened during that period. 96
In the light of these figures, there is no obvious explanation for the
sudden and dramatic drop in claims paid in 1970 or in the similarly
impressive decline in the number of claims filed in 1971. Two
problems have developed, however, both of which threaten the
continued usefulness of the panel. One of these problems has its roots
in the fundamental conflict between legal and medical professional
values which the panel was intended to ameliorate. The second
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
id.
Marshall interview, supra note 30; Moise interviews, supra note 71.
Insurance Report, supra note 91.
id.
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problem arises from insurance company attitudes toward screening
panels, particularly in New Mexico.
D. OperationalProblems
1. The Problem of SubstantialEvidence.
The rules governing the panel provide that, if it finds the plaintiff's
case supported by "substantial evidence" of negligence and the injury
caused by the negligence, it is to decide for the plaintiff and thus
commit itself to furnish expert testimony on the questions involved in
a judicial determination of liability. 97 "Substantial evidence" is a
term of art. Lawyers often think of it as the quantum of evidence
required to resist defendant's motion for a directed verdict. Physicians
may think it means weighing the evidence and deciding who has a
preponderance.
In the minds of many attorneys, substantial evidence is what is
required to take a case to jury.9 8 In some jurisdictions, motions for a
directed verdict are decided by the court in light of all evidence
presented-a method that frequently involves passing the credibility
of witnesses. Most American jurisdictions consider only evidence
favorable to the proponent and decide whether a reasonable jury can
find every fact required to prove the plaintiff's case. 99 However
defined in detail, the concept of substantial evidence is a familiar one
to lawyers.
It is not familiar to physicians who may consider it a preponderance. "As long as substantial evidence is the rule, the panel is
doomed," says an Albuquerque plaintiff's attorney. "Lawyers see it as
enough to get a case to a jury. Doctors see the evidence in terms of
what the jury will do. That's the difference between substantial
evidence, and a preponderance. ' 10 0
This is no small problem. It goes to one of the essential questions to
be determined by the panel: when is the claimant entitled to expert
testimony to help prove his case? If the quantum of evidence required
to persuade the panel to provide testimony is the same as or greater
than the quantum required to persuade the jury, then theoretically
the panel is of little help to a plaintiff in establishing his case.
In practice, we do not know if this is the case. Almost one-third of
all claimants coming before the panel win in that forum (Table I).
"I'll take in a good case or a poor one," says one Albuquerque
97. Joint Medical-Legal Plan for Screening Medical Negligence Cases (December 4, 1971).
98. R. Field & B. Kaplan, Civil Procedure 478-79 (temp. ed. 1968).
99. McBaine, Trial Practice: Directed Verdicts: Federal Rule, 31 Calif. L. Rev. 454, 460
(1943).
100. Interviews with Richard Ransom, attorney at law, in Albuquerque, April 3 and April 24,
1972.
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attorney. "If a case can go either way, taking it to the panel is
foolhardy."' 10 1 In part, says this lawyer, the panel provides a
convenient and satisfactory method for dispatching the weak claim,
while at the same time assuring the claimant that a hearing has taken
place, and that the claim has been thoroughly considered. And in
part, he adds, the panel is a means of efficiently handling the strong
case, of moving it expeditiously onward to settlement or trial. But he
believes that the panel is not proving useful to the most necessitous
plaintiff, the one whose case is difficult, who most needs expertise in
court, and who in the United States can expect to have his cause
decided, not by a panel of experts, but by a jury.
The available data do nothing to prove or disprove this attorney's
views on the panel, for the outcome statistics reflect the operation of
the panel not on all cases, but only on cases presented. If knowledgeable attorneys are not taking the close cases to the panel, then the
data will not reflect close decisions.
The differential understanding of the meaning of substantial
evidence seems capable of jeopardizing the panel's continued worth
to both medical and legal professions. In light of the preference of
physician members of the panel for a clear and convincing showing of
malpractice, 0 2 plaintiff's attorneys have made it a practice to bring
their cases to a state of trial readiness, complete with experts'
affidavits, prior to panel appearances. This has proved highly
offensive to medical panelists, who consider they have been called to
pass upon a matter already established, and thus to perform a
meaningless task. At a recent hearing, a plaintiff's attorney reports he
was thoroughly chastised for the extent of his preparation by a
medical member of the panel; in the ensuing argument, a lawyer
panel member resigned on the spot, vowing never to bring in a
malpractice case of his own.10 3 Clearly, unless the misunderstanding
surrounding the concept ot substantial evidence can be cleared up,
the panel stands to lose all credibility and thus all attraction to the
legal profession.
2. Insurance Industry Attitudes.
The attitudes of the insurance industry toward malpractice panels
and similar remedial devices seem to vary from company to company
and, perhaps, from place to place. It seems clear, however, that some
major insurance firms have viewed malpractice panels with mixed
feelings at best. Certainly the stakes are high. Table II indicates that
payments to claimants averaged about $200,000 annually during the
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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seven years studied. If it is true that costs are almost equal to payouts
in the malpractice insurance field, 10 4 then total charges against New
Mexico malpractice insurance policies averaged close to $400,000
yearly, or more than $500 per year for each of the approximately 780
physicians practicing in New Mexico.
"Until about a year ago," says a medical society spokesman, "St.
Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Cos., St. Paul, Minn. covered 50
percent of the physicans in the state. Last fall the company refused to
permit its cases to go to the panel. A January, 1972, hearing was
cancelled because St. Paul was the insurer. By itself, St. Paul can
cause a huge decline in the panel's work load."' 105
THE MEDICO-LEGAL MALPRACTICE PANEL
EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. General
This chapter considers the New Mexico program in light of
problems and practices elsewhere. It evaluates the program in terms
of fairness to the parties to malpractice litigation. The preceeding
chapters have suggested the following factors which should be taken
into account when evaluating and suggesting improvements in any
system of malpractice litigation:
1. Provision of Evidence for the Plaintiff.
The law of malpractice requires expert testimony throughout the
plaintiff's case. That testimony should be readily available for without
it, the plaintiff has a right without a remedy.
2. Protectionof the Physician.
The law does not hold the doctor as a guarantor of cures. It holds
him merely to the standards of his profession. Because these standards
cannot be fully appreciated by laymen, the law requires expert
testimony to prove them, and any departures from them. But the
doctor fears that complexities of the situation will render the case
incomprehensible to those who decide it. He also fears that the very
existence of cases, perhaps not meritorious, will blacken his profession's reputation. For these reasons, the physician often chooses
silence. If the physician is to be expected to speak, his professional
needs should be recognized. The facts of the case should at some point
be subject to professional scrutiny. The threat of publicity, which is a
punishment not contemplated by law, should not mature until after it
has been established that the claim has some factual ground.
104. Interview with an attorney who has frequently represented doctors, in Albuquerque,
April 11, 1972.
105. Marshall interview, supra note 30.
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3. Improvements in Education and Communication.
Doctors are often said to fail to understand or appreciate the
adversary process. Less often said but perhaps as truly so, lawyers may
have too little appreciation of medical attitudes. Laymen may have
no ideas at all, or misguided ones, about what consitutes medical
malpractice. Neither medicine nor the law have been active in
educating each other-, or in educating the public, on the malpractice
problem. For that reason, any plan to improve the existing situation in
malpractice litigation should provide for improved inter-professional
education and, hopefully, should make provision for improved
relations with the public as well. 1°6
4. Prompt Settlement.
It seems clear that defense costs impose a heavy burden on
physicians in the form of insurance charges, and upon the public that
pays doctors' bills. The more quickly and frequently settlement can
be brought about, the more significantly the defense-cost component
of malpractice will be reduced.
5. Rules Sufficient to Guide ProfessionalRelations.
Rules and procedures should prevent misunderstandings among
doctors, lawyers and patients. Where an attorney has a right to ask
questions, or a physician or hospital not to answer them, that should
be specified. Where formalities are called for, as with releases, that
should be apparent. Where a professional group has particular
dislikes, as physicians seem to dislike the use of subpoenas to compel
attendance as witnesses, there should be agreement on alternative
procedures to avoid unnecessary offense.
6. Supervision and Administration.
Where lists of participating lawyers and doctors must be kept up to
date, and where a professional society takes responsibility for such
tasks as gathering records prior to hearings, there should be vigorous
supervision to assure satisfactory administration.
7. Conclusiveness.
It is to the advantage of all concerned to bring malpractice claims
to a speedy end. Any mechanism dealing with malpractice problems
should, therefore, provide a clear answer, supported by reasons stated
in sufficient detail to convince the claimant that his case has been
106. Interview with Dr. T. L. Chiffelle, incumbent New Mexico medical-legal panel
chairman, in Albuquerque, New Mexico, March 21, 1972. Dr. Chiffelle felt that the educational
and communications problems in New Mexico were being solved and that such efforts may have
in fact reduced the number of malpractice suits significantly.
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fully considered, and to convince the plaintiff's attorney that the
findings provide a proper basis for further advice to the client.
B. Plaintiff'sEvidence-Physician'sProtection
Almost one-third of the cases heard by the medico-legal panel in
7
New Mexico are decided for the claimant.' 0 Such a decision clearly
enhances the value of the plaintiff's case. However, the value of the
expert testimony guaranteed by the Medical Society cannot be
determined with any degree of accuracy. It is clear that beginning in
the panel's third operational year, payments to claimants whether by
settlement or judgment increased markedly over the two prior
years. 108 Thus, the available evidence shows a coincidence in time
between panel operations and increased awards to claimants. But the
available data do not show a causal relationship between panel
activities and plaintiffs' recoveries. Though the available evidence is
incomplete, there is some indication that the panel's existence does
not account for increased payments to claimants. In the years 1964 to
1970 inclusive, 52 plaintiffs won damages, while only 26 won in the
forum provided by the panel. 10 9
Why the disparity, and how can it exist where physicians and
lawyers generally agree that few cases are processed in the courts
once they have been heard by the panel? Two answers suggest
themselves.
First, there are anecdotes concerning cases in which the panel
found no malpractice liability, but where defense attorneys recomplaintiff
mended settlement. They feared heavy damages because the
1 10 However
was believed to be an object for strong juror sympathy.
often this may happen, there is nothing in the panel's procedure that
binds a claimant to its decision; certainly a plaintiff's attorney who
believes he can take his case to the jury has an affirmative duty to
advise his client of his views, whether or not the panel has found
medical negligence in the case.
Second, a number of malpractice claims are indefensible. Foreign
objects left in a patient's body after surgery have been held to raise a
conclusive presumption of negligence."' There are other occurrences, such as explosions of anesthetic gases and failure to use X-rays
2
in diagnosis of fractures, that are very difficult to defend."1 And in
107. See, Table I, supra.
108. See, Table II, supra.
109. See, Tables I and II, supra.
110. A defense attorney interviewed in connection with this project reported one such
instance where, he said, the claimant's recovery amounted to more than $300,000. If this
occurred, it is not reflected in the data summarized in Table I.
111. Louisell & Williams, supra note 2, at 441-42.
112. Id.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3

some instances, the defense is in a difficult position because the
doctor's records are inadequate. 113 In cases such as these, there may
be little for lawyers to do but negotiate the terms of settlement.
Neither of these two possibilities suggests deficiences in the panel.
The plaintiff's attorney who believes he can take his case forward
without panel support has a duty to do so. Nor is there any reason for
the panel to decide cases where there is no controversy.
There is, however, a question whether the panel, by its very
existence, tends to shut off evidence that might otherwise be available
to plaintiffs. Attorneys for claimants report that, prior to the panel's
formation, many lawyers established sound working relationships with
a number of physicians who would be willing to testify in a proper
case. Since the panel was organized, these informal working relationships have deteriorated because of physicians' reluctance to involve
1 14
themselves in a claim unless and until it has gone before the panel.
For this reason, informal communications between the two professions may be less adequate now than they were a decade ago.
In one respect there seems to be very little question that the panel
has accomplished its objective. The number of malpractice suits
actually filed has showed a drastic decline. The panel's formation was
triggered by the filing of 42 malpractice suits in New Mexico with
much attendant publicity in the year preceding its establishment. In
the first year of the panel's operation, the number of suits filed fell
almost to zero. Because suits and their publicity are feared by
individual practitioners as dangers to professional reputation, and by
the medical profession as a whole as a stimulus to more suits, the
reduction in the number of suits filed represents a major gain in
protection of the profession. 1 15
Several observers believe that the reduction in number of suits filed
is a result of the panel's educational function. 116 The attorney who
rarely handles a malpractice case, or even the lawyer well versed in
medical matters, may in the course of a panel proceeding, learn that
what appears negligent is in fact a problem or risk well understood by
physicians. 117 But the panel performs this function only rarely, and
118
never by design.
113. Interview with an attorney who frequently has represented doctors, supra note 104.
114. Ransom Interview, supra note 100.
115. Marshall interview, supra note 30.
116. Chiffelle interview, supra note 106. Dr. Chiffelle reports that one major factor in
reducing suits might be that doctors are becoming aware of the need to keep accurate records,
to increase communication with their patients and to not ignore their complaints, and to bring
in specialists when they are required instead of proceeding without advice.
117. Moise interviews, supra note 71.
118. Interview with attorney who frequently has represented doctors, supra note 104. One
plaintiff's attorney reportedly was informed, for example, that he had misread his case because
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It is clear that a significant number of plaintiffs and their attorneys
regard the panel as a satisfactory means of seeking to forward their
case. Claims against 100 physicians have been presented. The panel
appears to have been attractive and useful to a good many of those
who consider themselves injured by medical negligence. It has been
successful in warding off many suits, and in reducing the volume of
publicity unfavorable to the medical profession. To that extent, it has
protected the state's physicians. But it is not clear that the panel has
succeeded in reducing either the number of malpractice claims, or
the dollar volume paid out by insurance companies on claims arising
from medical negligence.
C. Speed and Conclusiveness
The best available information indicates that only 30 to 40 cents of
the malpractice insurance premium dollar reaches injured claimants.
The balance goes to attorneys."i 9 It would seem apparent, then, that
any method of shortening and simplifying the claimant's recovery
process will reduce legal fees, which comprise 60 to 70 per cent of
malpractice costs. If attorneys' fees associated with malpractice cases
were to be reduced by one-third, that would yield a total cost
reduction on the order of 20 per cent.
The New Mexico Medico-Legal Panel presents no problems of
undue delay. Under the rules, cases are to be heard within 90 days of
2
filing. 120 Continuances are to be granted sparingly.' ' State court
dockets are not so crowded that they present problems of delay. Most
are said to
personal injury cases filed in New Mexico's district courts
22
filing.'
of
months
18
within
jury
a
to
trial
of
be capable
A panel decision for the claimant increases the value of the
plaintiff's case and, from the standpoint of the defense, makes
settlement more desirable. A decision for the defendant may diminish
the value of the case somewhat; certainly it will make the claim less
costly to settle. There is a feeling on the part of attorneys that case
handling toward settlement of trial would be expedited considerably
by relatively slight procedural additions.
"I wish the judgment of the panel were articulated in such a way as
to permit the parties to settle," says a plaintiff's lawyer who has made
many panel appearances. 123 And a defense attorney agrees: "I have
he misunderstood the capabilities of a suction device for performing abortions. The device had
failed to extract the fetus. Moise interview, supra note 71.
119. The Ribicoff Report, supra note 19.
120. Joint Medical-Legal Plan for Screening Medical Negligence cases, supra note 99.
121. Rules of Procedure, supra note 72. Rule 1.
122. Interview with an attorney who frequently has represented doctors, supra note 104;
Ransom interview, supra note 100.
123. Ransom interview, supra note 100.
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always felt that panel decisions should be on a qualitative rather than
a yes-no basis. The plaintiff's lawyer ought to know if he's got a case,
and if so, what kind."124 Under present procedures, however, a
claimant seeking recovery on multiple counts of negligence does not
know on which count the panel approved his case. And a plaintiff
losing before the panel may not know the reasons for his failure.
No screening panel makes provision for written opinions. Several,
however, do provide for consultation between a panelist and a party
or between a panel member and a physician selected to provide
expert testimony.' 2 5 Such a process should tend to make the panel's
decision more conclusive. And as a result, the process of disposing of
malpractice claims should be shortened.
At present, the New Mexico panel deliberates in secret and issues
no report, beyond its findings. Such secrecy is apparently essential to
the medical profession's support of the panel. 126 Because the panel
does not publicize its decisions, much less its reasons for them, it is
not developing a body of "case law" to aid attorneys in counseling
their clients. This is not, however, seen as a defect. "Fact patterns just
do not repeat themselves," says a panel member. "And everybody
involved is a volunteer-we don't have the time to get out written
opinions."' 12 7 But there does not appear to be anything in the
physicians' preference for secrecy that would prevent appropriate
consultations, on a paid basis if necessary, among claimants, their
lawyers, and appropriate panel members. Such consultations, in fact,
might add a great deal to the conclusive quality of the panel's
decisions, and thus speed disposition of malpractice claims.
D. InterprofessionalRelations
The text writers repeatedly refer to the disparity between the
professional values of doctors and lawyers. This disparity rests on
wholly different attitudes in the search for truth. The physician is said
to pursue a species of truth that is scientifically knowable and can be
arrived at by methods combining scientific objectivity and a kind of
intuition founded in long years of training and experience. Lawyers
are trained to participate in an adversary system that is held to be as
effective a means of disclosing "truth" in human affairs as any system
can be.' 2 8 Greatly simplified, there is an antagonism, perhaps
124. Interview with attorney who frequently has represented doctors, supra note 104.
125. See, e.g., the Berks County plan, supra note 53.
126. Moise interview, supra note 71.
127. Id.
128. W. Curran & E. Shapiro, Law, Medicine and Forensic Science 3 (2d ed. 1970); Louisell
& Williams, supra note 2, at 5.
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necessary and natural, between medicine's objective inquiry and law's
adversary method.
Neither party to this misunderstanding is likely to change its
professional values. Both sets of values are essential to professional
conduct, but what can come about is a greater appreciation of the
disparity and the reasons for it. Ideally, the medical profession, or at
least the panel's medical members, should be instructed on the
lawyer's duties to his client and on the manner in which those duties
fit into the conduct of a system intended to elicit the truth of a
controversy. Such instruction would help forestall future unpleasantness that could very well end the panel's usefulness.
There is also a feeling, however well or ill founded, that the panel
has become increasingly conservative-that it has become gradually
harder for the plaintiff to prevail.' 2 9 This view arises from the belief
that the panel is deciding the ultimate question of negligence-in-fact
rather than whether there is substantial evidence of it.
Whether the panel's standard for decision is to based upon a
scintilla of evidence or upon moral certainty, that standard should be
clearly understood by all persons in the forum, and it should be
consistently administered from one case to the next. Understanding
the standard is a matter of education, perhaps not best carried out in
the heat of controversy. Administering the standard calls- for some
degree of continuity in panel membership.
The latter has been achieved. Rule changes accepted in 1971
provide that the panel have a permanent chairman, a lawyer, who in
fact is a retired member of the State Supreme Court. 130 Hopefully,
the presence on the panel of a prestigious and continuing presiding
officer will eliminate some of the past problems of inconsistent
administration of decisional standards.
To improve the regulation of proceedings and perhaps to achieve
some degree of interprofessional education, it might be appropriate to
amend the panel's rules to include a prefatory discussion outlining the
duties of a lawyer to his client and the manner in which he can be
expected to discharge those duties in proceedings before the panel. It
might be equally valuable to state in the same way the physician's
duties as a panel member.
E. Administration of the Panel
One of the strengths of the New Mexico Medico-Legal Panel seems
to be its supporting administration. The State Medical Society takes
129. Ransom interview, supra note 100.
130. The complete rules, including 1971 changes, are given in 10 State Bar of N.M. Bull. 205
(August 19, 1971).
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the responsibility for accumulating and making available to the
parties all relevant records. Choice of panelists from among those who
have agreed to serve and the physical tasks required to hold meetings
are handled efficiently and quietly.
Availability of records is especially valuable. By themselves, they
may prove or disprove the plaintiff's case. And it is evidently far
easier for the medical group to collect the records than it would be
discovery rules, which,
for plaintiff's attorneys, even under the federal
131
by and large, are in effect in New Mexico.
A plan similar to New Mexico's and somewhat older, operates in
Tucson (Pima County), Arizona. Though long regarded as a highly
successful venture, the Arizona plan's usefulness is said to have
declined recently because of lax administration. 1 32 And, the usefulness
of the Los Angeles medical screening panel has been impaired 13by
3
failure to keep lists of the doctors willing to participate up to date.
F. Some Other Considerations
New Mexico has a relatively small population. All told, the state
contains about 1,030,000 people, of whom about one-third live in the
Albuquerque area. 134 Excluding physicians in the Public Health
Service and the armed services, the state is served by about 780
medical doctors. Most physicians are at least acquainted with a
135
majority of their colleagues.
This widespread professional acquaintanceship is generally seen as
a strength in the panel's process. The panel questions physician-defendants who appear before it; its knowledge of individuals and of
community practices and facilities reportedly lends insight to much of
136
this questioning.
All panel proceedings are conducted in Albuquerque. About 43 per
cent of the state's physicians practice in Albuquerque, but only an
estimated one-fifth of malpractice claims originate there. 137 Attorneys
and panel members, however, do not identify the necessity of travel
parties, their
for most of the parties as a problem. Ordinarily, only the
138
attorneys, and sometimes a claimant's spouse, appear.
131. Marshall interview, supra note 30; Ransom interview, supra note 100. The discovery
rules are Fed. R. Civ. P. 26-37; N.M. Stat. Ann. §§21-1-1 (33) to (37) (Repl. 1968). New Mexico
and federal rules differ chiefly in that the state does not permit discovery of insurance coverage,
which may be discovered under the federal rules.
132. Marshall interview, supra note 30.
133. Letter from Donald 0. Hagler, supra note 35.
134. 25 New Mexico Business 1, 7 et seq. (January, 1972).
135. Marshall interview, supra note 30.
136. Id.; Moise interview, supra note 71.
137. Marshall interview, supra note 30.
138. Id., Moise interview, supra note 71.
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There is a widespread feeling among doctors that many malpractice claims are wholly without merit-that they are pressed as
blackmail, in the hope that the defendant physician will settle rather
than risk the publicity of a suit. 139 Recently, the State Medical
Society polled doctors who had served on the panel. These physicians
expressed the belief that most cases heard by the panel were
sufficiently well founded to warrant a hearing. Only one doctor-panelist said that as many as three cases he had heard did not seem to
have sufficient merit to justify the proceeding.140
G. The Panel and Malpractice Insurers
Uncertainty seems to characterize the relationship between the
New Mexico Medico-Legal Panel and the insurance companies that
write malpractice coverage in the state. As a practical matter, the
companies seem able to determine whether the panel will serve any
useful purpose at all. They may refuse to represent insured defendants
in its proceedings-one company has evidently done so. They may also
prevent the appearance before the panel of insured physicians by
invoking the standard cooperation clause contained in liability
insurance contracts. 141
At the outset, New Mexico doctors hoped the panel would
significantly reduce amounts paid out to malpractice claimants. This,
evidently, has not occurred.' 4 2 Nor should it. The panel does not
consider the damages question; it confines itself entirely to consideration of the liability issue. 143 There is not necessarily a relationship
between the number of cases heard and the total dollar volume of
claim payments. In the years 1964-1970 inclusive, as shown in Table
II, almost 40 percent of the total payments shown were damages in
only one case.
The State Medical Society hopes that about 80 per cent of the
state's physicians will be covered by its group within the next three
years. That will place the society in a position to learn how the
company determines premiums, payouts, and profit and loss on
malpractice coverage. 144
It would seem that there are two points on which malpractice
insurance carriers might object to panel operations. First, the
139. See notes 19 and 20, supra.
140. Marshall interview, supra note 30.
141. Id. The cooperation clause was discussed at length and applied as a policy condition by
Cardozo in Coleman v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 247 N.Y. 271, 160 N.E. 367 (1927). Farley
v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 415 P.2d 680 (1966), is a more liberal interpretation of the
clause.
142. See Table 11, supra.
143. Joint Medical-Legal Plan for Screening Medical Negligence Cases, supra note 99.
144. Marshall interview, supra note 30.
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relatively quick operation of the panel lessens to some extent the
ability of the defense to delay final settlement. This makes it harder to
starve a claimant into settlement. Second, the available data indicate
that, whether or not there is a causal relationship, payments to
claimants have gone up very markedly during the years of the panel's
operation.' 4 5 Whatever the reasons, the recent decline in cases
coming to the panel mhy be attributed to the attitude of one
insurance carrier.
G. Recommendations
This survey of the New Mexico Medico-Legal Malpractice Panel is
by no means complete. Several suggestions emerge from the study,
however, that may prove useful to doctors and lawyers as they
attempt to deal professionally with malpractice litigation. Also,
several avenues for further research seem apparent.
1. InterprofessionalEducation.
At least to the extent required for harmonious conduct of panel
business and ideally to the extent required to expedite interprofessional relations generally, the State Bar Association and the New
Mexico Medical Society should undertake whatever programs seem
appropriate to inform physicians of lawyers' duties to clients, and to
-advise them of the standard of decision to be applied in malpractice
cases.
2. The Views of the Insurance Industry.
There are strong indications that malpractice insurers view extrajudicial forums with misgivings. These misgivings should be specified
and detailed so that future development of the panel concept can take
into account to the greatest extent possible the perceived interests of
the insurance carriers.
3. Articulationof Decisions.
To promote the usefulness and conclusiveness of their decisions and
educate plaintiffs and their attorneys, the panel should advise the
claimant and his counsel, or the physician appointed to serve as an
expert witness, or both, of the reasons for its decision.
4. Review of the Rules.
The rules governing the panel should be reviewed to assure that
they describe the rights and duties of the parties and the obligations of
panelists with clarity and sufficient detail. It should be stated that
145. See Table III and discussion, supra.
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panelists have responsibility for maintenance of decorum and of
judicial attitudes. Whatever their origins, incidents wherein counsel
are abused by the panel should be avoided. Given the fact that
relatively few attorneys handle a relatively large proportion of panel
cases, the alienation of even one such lawyer can seriously undercut
the usefulness of the entire panel concept.
5. FurtherResearch.
The correlation between panel operations, filing of malpractice
claims, and payouts on claims is not at all understood. A survey now
in progress under State Bar auspices goes to the heart of this matter.
Its interpretation should cast a great deal of light on the internal
dynamics of the malpractice problem.
It is the unanimous opinion of all concerned that the medico-legal
panel performs a variety of useful functions. It may provide a forum
in which a survivor is assured that a loved one's loss was not caused by
carelessness or negligence. 146 There is a widespread feeling that the
panel has been instrumental in holding back publicity unfavorable to
the medical profession. But what would have happened had the panel
not existed? How does the panel compare, in terms of effects, with
other extra-judicial methods of resolving malpractice controversies?
The literature on malpractice, as oceanic as it geems to be, contains
no answers to these questions. To develop these answers, comparative
studies are required. Such comparisons should deal with the fundamental question: whether extra-judicial means, or special legal
developments, are useful and should be used in malpractice claims.
Thoughtful comparisons, however, may do far more than prove the
usefulness of a particular panel in a particular place. The panel, in
essence, is a mode of dealing with controversies arising from the vast
complexity of scientific and technological achievement that distinguishes the modem world. Such controversies are often complex, and
solutions may require extraordinary expertise and sophistication.
Perhaps, as studies proceed, the experiences of New Mexico and other
communities attempting to deal with the difficulties of malpractice
claims will illuminate the paths toward solutions of similar problems.
JOSEPH FULCHER
MARTIN PASKIND
BRUCE WIGGINS

146. Ransom interview, supra note 100.

